

1. Check with Wolf  
on running Project:  
Cph, etc.



2. Conference?

3. ~~Grand scheme for~~  
~~Lessons of Rebellion.~~



4. Product is 3-6 months

5. CIRADS.

6. Carnegie money





E6L

Banding

Val

Bloomfield

Bolte:

Compton list

Margolis  
et al

2d-order  
argument :



1.  $R + A$ .
2. VN letters

Whose nation & interest —  
blacks, browns, drafters?

---

Why not if guns for key —  
why not for blacks in  
Rhodesia?

20.6 per 1000  
infant mortality ; in  
Sweden 12.6.

for whites (non-white  
twice as much).

---

race problem — what  
did Dems do?

(VN?)

Dem  
Marx Plan / Sacramento State

There's a lot of people  
criticizing the President  
— well, maybe he is  
screwing up ...  
but he said he  
had a secret way to  
end the war —  
he can keep a secret  
as good as anyone I've  
ever seen...

---

Ochs:

Election: 3 right-  
wing ass-holes...

[need to stop the  
bullshit...]

Things not believed...

How can little RAND  
discussion of:

ABM

ASW!

MIRV

NPT; anti-prolif

(no first use)

(Russia; Wolf)

VN - What went wrong

What could/should

have been done

What to do

US aims

000 Budget

Hoag!

Strategic aims

(e.g. "min. Deterrence")

no first use.



MESSAGE

TO

DE

DATE

11/14

TIME

1:30

A.M.

P.M.

DURING YOUR ABSENCE

NAME

Sam Papkin

PHONE NO. (8) (9)

Boston Apr. 20

OF

at home: 617-876-5545

or work: 868-7600 ex. 3272

☒

PHONED

☒

CAME BY

☒

PLEASE PHONE

☐

WANTS TO SEE YOU

☐

RETURNED YOUR CALL

☐


WILL PHONE AGAIN

MESSAGE

Handwritten scribbles and letters (P, N, K, A) covering the message area.

BY





Make avoidance of bloodbath  
our primary goal — instead  
of pressing Saigon  
Neutralized South  
1-4 mil in China

How did they move into  
Coch area in the North?

## 2 new Penguins -

---

- ① The Liberation of Guiné  
Bartlett?
- ② The War in Mozambique  
Eduardo Mondlane

3. Dorothy Macardie, History of the Irish Republic

✓

Art - The TFX Decision Little Brown  
Stone - Strategic Persuasion Columbia

ABM - An Evaluation Charges & Weiss Harper

Oran Yong, The Politics of Farer Princeton  
Tang Tsan, China - Crisis, Vol. 2 Chicago 1968

Mont Halperin Contemporary Military Strategy  
Little Brown 1967 ~~John & John~~

Franklin + La Brea

Franklin West

Tony Harris

MEMORANDUM

To: Dan Ellsberg

Date: 7/16

From: Guy J. Pauker

This is the best account  
published by the press  
on Olson's relations with  
his brother.

For your files.

Quass -

Simon, etc.

Mitchell, et al

Poe Study

~~Poe RM~~

~~Shubert~~



Simon — Models of Man

Calvin Johnson  
Peasant Revolution

←  
Bobannon + Valeriano



## "Alternatives"

"Actions" must have  
a subj. prob. for the  
actor  $> 0$  and  $< 1$

(and for observer, if he  
is to regard them as "real options").

---

But suppose that S.p. remains  
close to 0 even as several  
dimensions of outcome (but  
not all) are greatly improved....  
~~actions~~ (and that one dimension  
will not improve, or defines action)  
→ action "not an option"

"If A believed that  
action x would have certain  
certain consequences...

would his s. p. of "doing it"  
be affected?

Vann

~~o Bleibung~~      Tony  
~~o Fenger~~      Brian

~~o Low~~  
~~Dod~~

Yed RM

~~West~~

funkis } learning  
Wiener }

Scotton

Peyton

Mitchell RM

RAND Revue

Killen memo/4 RM



Sand Iki RM to;

Lt. Col. . Britten

Doolin

Wick

Nutter

Cooke

## Value of Info

One can speak of  
"quantity of info" input  
(into a channel) as well  
as output.

But can one speak of  
"value of info" as  
~~input~~ input, i.e. to  
sender? Or first as  
output, to receiver?

Rothstein, p. 16

"the impossibility of  
extracting more info  
from a comm channel  
than is put into it."

Is this meaningful — and if  
so, true — for value of  
info?

---

"amount of info"  $\approx$  amount of  
reduction in uncertainty

---

"Value of info"  $\approx$  value of  
(specific)  
reduction in uncertainty

(which depends on actions, utilities,  
and the specific form of reduction)

✓ Damage

✓ Critical Postures

3 Thai D's: Pac

Dim

US Aims

---

Chi (2?)

Thai muncon

Rev Judo

Critique of W-L

Learning

US Proposal Pattern

Violent Politics: Talk

Mitchell/Russos

Killer/Butter

Politics and US

NVR



Bagdikian

~~1758~~ 17951 Fremont Dr.

7:30

P.C.H.

1st Lt. N of Summit: Porto Marino  
at on  
Breue Way: left on Castellana;  
left on Fremont  
Opp is the house (small, bourgeois)

room / 800

2616


Enthorn

Stem / Hoffman

Painter - Chan  
Sullivan

8820 Webster

Dr. Levin



7

Stem  
277-2900

Century City



5/5





~~Wally~~



Vann

~~Kou~~

~~Pat~~

Kou  
Oclana

EX-30486  
#312

Arnstern

~~FSV~~

Stein

Leints

~~7359~~

lake

7377

---


White Scatton

VN

Bill Edwards

(Bungarden? CAS Korea)

---


Adlai Stevenson Inst   
Guggenheim

CFR

Center for Behavioral Sci  
(Geny)  
Inst. for Advanced Study

Center of Advanced Study  
Univ. of Illinois  
Urbana

Berkeley - Wildavsky  
Kennedy Institute  
Kennedy School





Palk

Halperin

Morgenthau

Gilpatric

McG B

List



Conboy

Dalles

1:15



~~Lawrence~~

Walinsky }  
Brown }



Ostraw

Dron

Shunt

Digby

Dub

Kimberly

Jean-Louis  
Bergoin

5<sup>th</sup> flr.

Two lunch  
Komer

2 Dec

Drac

AJW

Gill

Brown

Walinsky

Ostron 

Komer



Duo  
Kevin

TUW



Shubert

Amster

Leites







Kenneth

1 + 2

Brown

Walshy

Kidder


Dad

Bolté

PERT-Book

Anty Still





Send "letter memos"  
to Roger Levin ✓

---

Send Bryk memos to RL

---

Droz - Levin - Archibald?  
proposal for PA studies  
at RAND.

---

~~Hille - JTM memos~~

---

Peretz  
476-1974

Keller

---

Letter to Balti

---

Shubik

AAAS

Newstadt  
Schelling





## Crisis

Tarkin Half:

Importance of context, i.e. interrupting actions:

- a) 34A action, at same time as Maddox
  - b) 1st PT attack (i.e. interrupting 2d)
  - c) After Tarkin: failure to continue attacks could signal lack of resolve. (JCS: Simon, p. 23)
- But also: convenience of 2d attack (given "cocked" condition & desire to do)  
→ perception as attack.

Cocked condition: announcement of tough stance after 1st attack, to cover failure to respond. (like announcement on "offensive mistakes" in Cuba.)

## Assess

Price we paid for:

- 1) avoiding Geneva conference, fall '64
- 2) maintaining stability of SVN
- 3) Maintaining SVN morale for pacification (Simon, p. 31)

→ Escalation pressure of new precedent — making failure to continue, repeat, reinforce, "revealing" of lack of resolve.

Bonny: Recognized <sup>by world</sup> as failure now — in lengthy but "bijing NVN to talk finally." (or "when there is also progress in South.") So:







(a) Now that there won't be progress in South . . .

(b) Is it easier to admit a ~~large~~<sup>overall</sup> failure or a component failure?

Are we unable to close out even the bombing? How about SVN, then?

Should admitting failure on bombing be rehearsed for admitting failure in SVN; or, just as difficult (better to wait, do both together?)

(How to "hunker down"? Could we prevent offensives like these?

Could we have? Is it too late?

How long to regain where we were?

Note that attacks on cities also (a. fort.) increase insecurity in villages.

[ Analyze Rostow's thesis in terms of Theory of Blackmail

~~Thesis~~ Thesis

(Rostow)

(Did we count on Com "tactical flexibility" to allow us to win with the bombing? They haven't shown much (Thesis: influence of ~~the~~ China) (Thesis: contrast to Ho vs. French, 1953).







Poe (Linn)

Assumption always that "popular support for GVN directly proportional to degree of protection given provided" (first Taylor assumption, Aug 64). McN, etc. ...

(Providing security is necessary to support: not sufficient. This leads to great overestimate of effective support (perhaps underestimate of potential support

Thus, they — "just provide the security, and... (they'll get together, cooperate, etc.)... always underestimated fragility of gains, ability to hold gains if troops left, sliding of covert VC to survive. (i.e. over-rated coop of people even while troops were there).

---

~~Note~~ Note response to Khanh's Viet Tan Charter in August — demand for Assembly: not a US idea!  
(Leadership wants this; <sup>urban</sup> masses willing to follow leaders in protest.)  
Students...

Like Ky's reaction to Honolulu, 1966: fine Thi →  
(Any parallel when we (A) backed (B) brought troops?)

---

Did no Cabinet Officers argue strongly against backing: or for pulling out?  
(McN considered? Ball?)







Feb 1968

— Prospects for bombing.

— Wickham column.

— US flags in Hurl —

(Fripower used became troops at K. S. : Common  
plan? Com-prepared US tactics. DePuy :  
vs. Delta; vs. cities!)







Simon

Did JKA, de Lato, etc. (count) prepare Admin insiders psychologically for bombing (whereas public was unprepared)? (just as Ross prepared the for VN?)

In late '64, our view of requirements for GVN became  
"adequate base for what we may later have to do" outside SVN.

(Rostow, 23 Sept)

i.e. rather minimal aim — just, stability. (Wary over GVN "morale":  
meaning, tending toward corps? Hence, need to (a) prove US will  
(b) avoid pressure on GVN.)

Gvt. willingness to start looking over if GVN was weak!







McV to Fulbright 20 Feb 68

"Masters" to suggest De Soto could have been deliberate provocation.  
Yet in full '64, great thought to provocation; and all the people he  
mentioned did know the plans.







## My paper:

US

- Tendency to list ARVN failures; then attribute all to lack of unity of command

(III, p 2-4)

(or, "overall plan.")

US

- Tendency to list GVN failures: then attribute all <sup>present complaints</sup> problems to "failure to


III, p 6-8, 9

provide security." (or, to ignore all others).

(Chair: GVN anonymous  
VC style + origin)


Diem view (III, p. 11) close to MACV







Sacks:



Chair: in Sept '69 with "Sacks" Committee

Favored ceasefire, and  
electoral commission  
(rejected coalition)

---

Mich. put in jail for 5 years; but was  
pardoned

Pres. statement deploring

Pres. letter to Thieu

House Special Resolution — in favor of  
free elections

Ozer, Chair

Journal

Office of Asian Studies Account

Shaner ✓

~~Remondet~~ / Roman

Time ✓

Marjined

Kraft

Halberstan

Shedan / Wicken

Moose ✓

Komer

West

San Wilson

Fleming <sup>off</sup> 386-8381

\* 456-2877

~~Polyfoto~~

June

~~385-8151~~


878-1190

Reff

Spiegel  
Skutik  
Mötarland

Nona Brown

293-3100





US action I:

Action in support of a current  
regime is not intervention.



~~Baiz~~

Walinsky

Browne

~~Distrone~~

~~Dentist~~

Dvor

Kellen

Paua

+

Ikli }

Wolf }

hsv

④

Moraton

Book

RAND - VN

RAND - SA/PA  
(ORSA)

Heing

Brayk/Ethio

Archibald

Bagdikian

Russo

④

④

④

Chi

Ther - send 6 RMs

④

Popkin - send mass work  
by Allen Goodman

Brown - MIT

96.13

④


4

4

Ans. Clark

Mrs. Smith

Sacks -



Nona Brown  
NYT Mag

VP Office

Sacks ✓

EGL



Kids

Sharon

Maria

Diane

Kinda/Tony ✓



Channel 2 7 AM

7 PM

Bunke

Barrett

McFadden ✓

Brown

Love

Dad

Kon

Harry

Chace

Von Hush

Kimberly


Deitch

Alan

Frankie

Kornstein





Bagdikian - Kraft  
Columns

(A - call Ev? / Cooke

Raife

Kahn

Rosenberg

(New Republic) hsr

Tickets

money

~~Chatter~~

paper to take  
McGarry

---

Wissner

Komer

Phillips

EGL

Burnham

Hudson

(Chair list)

Britton

Parker

# MESSAGE

TO Don DATE 3/16

TIME 12:50 P.M.

## DURING YOUR ABSENCE

NAME Mr. Uliassi

PHONE NO. (8) (9) 202-632-0980

OF Dept. of State

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PHONED       | <input type="checkbox"/> CAME BY          |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PLEASE PHONE | <input type="checkbox"/> WANTS TO SEE YOU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> RETURNED YOUR CALL      | <input type="checkbox"/> WILL PHONE AGAIN |

MESSAGE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Quero

\_\_\_\_\_

BY \_\_\_\_\_

Advisers:

- Lt. Col. David E. Farmer
- Frank Wiener
- Sam Wilson

(Asst. Commandant  
of Wafarum School)

- Komer

Vince Davis for

Director of the Draft



have been known to use that term after arguing with him on operational matters--he is stubborn, proud, convinced of his way of doing it--but not, or not very much, ~~for~~ because he rates personal status very highly.



with Raskin

I agree/that it is a task of the highest urgency to put restraints on the use of advanced technology. But if the concept of "war crime" is to play the important role that it should in this ~~effort~~ effort, its current usage will have to be <sup>expanded</sup> extended. At present, it seems mainly to be applied to face-to-face atrocities of rape and murder using relatively primitive instruments of violence. ~~It is necessary to take a deliberate educational campaign to expand this same~~ <sup>needed</sup> ~~educational, political, and legal campaign to expand this same~~ <sup>extend</sup> ~~To expand this same social, and moral/and legal~~ <sup>and legal</sup> ~~uses of advanced technology--in particular, to bombing and shelling of civilians--that cause far greater unjustified suffering and pose incomparably greater risks to humanity.~~ <sup>more</sup> ~~The bombing in particular,~~ <sup>the bombing in particular,</sup> ~~this applies of refer to the strategic bombing of non-combatants, as in Dresden,~~

 <sup>above all</sup> ~~What must urgently be condemned~~ <sup>today</sup> ~~is barbaric uses~~ <sup>social, moral, legal</sup>

<sup>most needs condemning today</sup> ~~What above all must be condemned in this era, with all the social, moral, legal force we can bring to bear, is the barbaric~~

~~uses of advanced technology.~~ <sup>it is just the</sup> ~~Yet surely this highly~~

<sup>"sophisticated"</sup> ~~technological atrocities~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~tend to elude legal and moral~~ <sup>stigma</sup> ~~as application of the concept of war crimes, that is~~ <sup>commonly applied.</sup>

IV

<sup>while we properly</sup> ~~yet it is shocking, that we manage to~~ <sup>would be</sup> ~~condemn rape and~~ <sup>to continue to</sup> ~~murder in warfare, while we tolerate the strategic~~ <sup>Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the now</sup> ~~bombing of non-combatants, as in~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~"free fire zones" of South Vietnam.~~



talked -- my notes read toward the end -- to a high North Vietnamese official, who had provoked these reflection. "I wanted to find out his motives." This was, I realize as I read this now, his communist brother, Tran Ngoc Hien.

[Transition to CT force for RVNAF was  
impeded by US <sup>MAAG</sup> influence 1955-60.

[Not interfering "now" may mean more  
effective + careful intervention later.]

"Progress": (a) arming and training of RVNAF  
(from nothing; for w/rag war) 1955-60;  
meanwhile, (b) VC bull. (c) GVN (Diem) success  
against non-Comm opposition. !





McHenry <sup>S</sup> 5-door safe

x x



Hayward City to help Chan on the  
rebuilding of Ben ~~Tran~~ Tre



City Council of Ben Tre

